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a b s t r a c t
The outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has caused 209 deaths and
699 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases in the Arabian Peninsula as of June 11, 2014. Preparedness efforts are
hampered by considerable uncertainty about the nature and intensity of human-to-human transmission,
with previous reproduction number estimates ranging from 0.4 to 1.5. Here we synthesize epidemiological data and transmission models for the MERS-CoV outbreak during April–October 2013 to resolve
uncertainties in epidemic risk, while considering the impact of observation bias. We match the progression of MERS-CoV cases in 2013 to a dynamic transmission model that incorporates community and
hospital compartments, and distinguishes transmission by zoonotic (index) cases and secondary cases.
When observation bias is assumed to account for the fact that all reported zoonotic cases are severe, but
only ∼57% of secondary cases are symptomatic, the average reproduction number of MERS-CoV is estimated to be 0.45 (95% CI:0.29–0.61). Alternatively, if these epidemiological observations are taken at face
value, index cases are estimated to transmit substantially more effectively than secondary cases, (Ri = 0.84
(0.58-1.20) vs Rs = 0.36 (0.24–0.51)). In both scenarios the relative contribution of hospital-based transmission is over four times higher than that of community transmission, indicating that disease control
should be focused on hospitalized patients.
Adjusting previously published estimates for observation bias conﬁrms a strong support for the average
R < 1 in the ﬁrst stage of the outbreak in 2013 and thus, transmissibility of secondary cases of MERS-CoV
remained well below the epidemic threshold. More information on the observation process is needed
to clarify whether MERS-CoV is intrinsically weakly transmissible between people or whether existing
control measures have contributed meaningfully to reducing the transmissibility of secondary cases. Our
results could help evaluate the progression of MERS-CoV in recent months in response to changes in
disease surveillance, control interventions, or viral adaptation.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

Introduction
An outbreak of novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is ongoing in the Arabian Peninsula, with the
ﬁrst case identiﬁed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in June 2012 (Zaki et al.,
2012). Phylogenetic analyses have indicated that the novel virus
emerged in July 2011, with broad uncertainty range, and that the
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outbreak results from multiple introductions of a weakly transmissible virus that is geographically dispersed (Cotten et al., 2013). A
total of 699 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of infection with MERSCoV, including 209 deaths, have been reported as of June 11, 2014
(The World Health Organization, 2014). Sporadic cases have been
imported to Europe, Africa, Asia and North America via returning
travelers from the Middle East, but no sustained transmission has
been reported in those regions.
Sporadic introductions of MERS-CoV into humans are suspected
to involve bats (Ithete et al., 2013) and/or camels (Reusken et al.,
2013; Haagmans et al., 2014) with camels implicated as the likely
source of most zoonotic infections of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2014.09.011
1755-4365/© 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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(Alagaili et al., 2014). Meanwhile, there is considerable uncertainty about the extent of human-to-human transmission and it is
unclear whether MERS-CoV has the potential for epidemic spread.
Transmission appears limited among family members but may
be ampliﬁed in health care settings (Cotten et al., 2013; Breban
et al., 2013). An understanding of the MERS-CoV epidemiology
and transmission pathways are critically needed to devise effective
surveillance, prevention and control strategies.
The reproduction number, R, which measures the average number of secondary cases from each infected person, is a useful metric
for assessing the transmission potential of an emerging pathogen
such as MERS-CoV (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 2007). If
R < 1 then infections occur in isolated clusters as self-limited chains
of transmission, and persistence of the disease requires continued animal-to-human infections (Anderson and May, 1991). When
averaged over all reported cases, two recent studies have estimated
an overall R (denoted Roverall ) to be in a range of 0.42–0.92 (Breban
et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014), thus diminishing the concern
of MERS-CoV epidemic spread. In contrast, when R is evaluated for
just the index cases originating from animal-to-human transmission, estimates (denoted Ri ) can be as high as 1.5 (Cauchemez et al.,
2014), suggesting that epidemic spread is possible.
In order to implement effective surveillance and control measures, it is important to understand the reason for the difference in
inferred values of Roverall and Ri . One possibility is that secondary
(human-to-human) cases transmit less than index cases, either
because of intrinsic biological differences, or because of less effective control measures for index cases relative to secondary cases. A
second possibility is that the transmission potential of index and
secondary cases is similar, but many weakly transmitting index
cases are unobserved. The tendency to identify and report larger
clusters (whose index case cause a higher than average number of
new cases) would lead to an overestimation of Ri (Ferguson et al.,
2004; Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a,b; Farrington et al., 2003;
Rimoin et al., 2010). It is important to evaluate both possibilities,
because the optimal utilization of public health resources depends
on the relative transmission potential of primary and secondary
cases.
To gain perspective on the troublesome wide range of R estimates straddling the epidemic threshold of 1 associated with the
2013 outbreak of MERS-CoV, we develop a stochastic transmission model that distinguishes the transmission of index cases from
secondary cases and incorporates different reporting scenarios for
index cases. In order to relate case observation to disease severity
we also distinguish cases that are sick enough to become hospitalized from those who are treated entirely in the community. We
use a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo estimation technique to match
our model with observed MERS-CoV 2013 case data, provide estimates of the reproduction number, and revisit earlier estimates
(Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) through the lens of
reporting bias. Finally, we highlight residual data gaps that would
be particularly useful to clarify the transmission process in 2014
and beyond.

Materials and methods
Data sources
Our analysis focuses on the progression of the MERS-CoV outbreak in April–October 2013, a period when pro-active surveillance
was in place in Saudi Arabia (Memish et al., 2014), the country
where most cases have been reported thus far. The beginning of our
study period coincides with the onset of a large hospital outbreak
on April 8, 2013 (Assiri et al., 2013a), which prompted an increase in
the incidence of MERS-CoV case reports in the country (Cauchemez
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et al., 2014; Penttinen et al., 2013), resulting in a steady case detection rate (Memish et al., 2014) and a balanced male-female ratio.
Our study period ends in October 2013 so that our estimates can
be compared with earlier studies focused on the early phase of the
MERS-CoV outbreak (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014);
in particular we do not consider the resurgence of cases reported
in Spring 2014 (The World Health Organization, 2014).
We analyzed a line list of laboratory-conﬁrmed and probable
MERS-CoV cases from various sources including WHO bulletins and
media reports, obtained through passive epidemiological surveillance and case contact tracing (Rambaut, 2013). For each of the
122 cases with symptoms reported during April 8 and October
31, 2013, we obtained the dates of symptom onset and hospital
admission, reporting date, disease severity (asymptomatic, mild,
and severe) and transmission category (i.e., index case, secondary
case, as assessed by health authorities) (Rambaut, 2013).
MERS-CoV index cases were those with no identiﬁed exposure
to other cases prior to disease onset and were considered to be
zoonotic cases (i.e. arising from animal-to-human transmission).
We also distinguished between transmission occurring in the hospital and in the community, based on surveillance reports.
Asymptomatic cases were deﬁned as patients who did not
exhibit symptoms but had laboratory conﬁrmation of MERS-CoV
infection (World Health Organization, 2013) while severe cases
included all hospitalized cases, with possible admission to intensive
care unit.
Epidemiological scenarios
To reﬂect uncertainty in the observation process of MERSCoV cases, we considered two epidemiological scenarios. In a
‘surveillance bias’ scenario (scenario A), we assume that index and
secondary cases have similar transmission properties, but only the
hospitalized index cases are detected (Fig. 1). This scenario assumes
the reason all observed index cases required hospitalization is
that the observation process is ﬂawed and can only detect severe
index cases. In a ‘differential-transmission’ scenario (scenario B),
we assume that all index cases develop severe disease, require hospitalization, and thus contribute more to the overall transmission
process than a typical secondary case (Cauchemez et al., 2014).
In both scenarios, secondary cases can either be asymptomatic,
mild or severe and thus have zero, weak or strong transmissibility,
respectively.
Stochastic SEIR transmission model
We employed a stochastic SEIR-type compartmental transmission model (e.g., Anderson and May, 1991; Chowell et al., 2003;
Riley et al., 2003; Lipsitch et al., 2003; Diekmann and Heesterbeek,
2000; Gumel et al., 2004) that incorporates key epidemiological
features of the MERS-CoV outbreak (WHO MERS, 2013), including zoonotic transmission from an unspeciﬁed animal reservoir,
and human-to-human transmission in the community and hospital (Fig. 1, Text S1). The model is stochastic, which is particularly
important to consider when overall disease incidence is low. In our
main analysis, we ﬁt the model to observed outbreak size data at
the end of the study period in each of the 3 transmission settings
(reservoir, community, hospital), and run sensitivity analyses by
trajectory matching the daily progression of cumulative cases.
In this model, the population is divided into 9 categories
(Fig. 1): Susceptible individuals (S); Individuals exposed to the
zoonotic reservoir (Ei ) or to infectious humans (Es ), Infectious and
symptomatic individuals arising from reservoir (Ii ), or from humanto-human transmission (Is ); Asymptomatic and non-infectious
individuals arising from environmental/animal exposure (Ai ) or
arising from human-to-human transmission (As ); hospitalized
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the transition of cases (indicated by arrows) among the different epidemiological states in our model (Text S1).
Under ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A, index (zoonotic) and secondary cases follow a similar epidemiological progression (full model).
Under ‘transmission bias’ scenario B, index and secondary cases follow a different epidemiological progression: all index cases are symptomatic, develop severe disease, and
require hospitalization (i.e., compartmental model in which the dashed arrows and compartment are removed).
We assume that only the symptomatic cases are observed. The description and corresponding estimates of the epidemiological parameters are given in Table 1.

individuals (H); and removed individuals after recovery or diseaseinduced death (R). The total population size (N) of Saudi Arabia is
∼29 million and assumed to be initially completely susceptible, in
line with serosurveys (Tefanie Gierer et al., 2013; Aburizaiza et al.,
2013).
The system of nonlinear differential equations that describe
the full transmission model is given in supporting Text S1. Susceptible individuals are infected uniformly at random from the
zoonotic reservoir at rate ˛, generating index cases· Susceptible
individuals infected through contact with infectious individuals
(secondary cases) enter the latent period at rate ˇ(Ii + Is + lH)/N
where ˇ is the mean human-to-human transmission rate per day
and l quantiﬁes the relative transmissibility of hospitalized patients
compared to symptomatic patients in the community. Thus 0 < l < 1
would represent partially effective hospital isolation measures that
decrease MERS-CoV transmission probability below that seen in
the community, and l > 1 denotes increased transmission in the
hospital relative to the community, potentially due to biologic
or epidemiologic reasons. We make the simplifying assumption
that asymptomatic individuals do not contribute to the transmission process (Leung et al., 2006; Ksiazek et al., 2003; Lee et al.,
2003).
A proportion c,i of latent index cases individuals in Ei progress
to the symptomatic infectious class Ii at the rate Ä while the
rest (1 − c,i ) progress to asymptomatic and non-infectious class
Ai at the same rate Ä. Only the symptomatic cases are observed.
Symptomatic index infectious individuals Ii are hospitalized at the
average rate  a or recover without being hospitalized at the average
rate  I,i Similarly, a fraction c,s of secondary cases in Es progress
to the symptomatic class Is at the rate Ä while the rest (1 − c,s )
progress to asymptomatic and non-infectious class As at the same
rate Ä. Symptomatic secondary infectious Is -individuals are hospitalized at average rate  a or recover without being hospitalized
at average rate  I,s . Individuals in the “removed” class do not contribute to the transmission process.

We ﬁt simulations to three types of observed MERS-CoV epidemiological data. First, we use the cumulative number of index
cases reported during the Apr-Oct 2013 study period, which is the
number of cases progressing to the Ii compartment in our model
and follows equation Ci (t) (Text S1). Second, we use the cumulative number of secondary symptomatic community cases, which
is the number of cases progressing to the Is compartment in our
model and follows equations Cs (t). Lastly, we consider the cumulative number of symptomatic secondary cases that are generated
by hospitalized patients, including inpatients, health care workers,
and visitors of hospital patients, which is given by equation CIH (t)
in our model.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario (A), the proportion of
exposed (latent) individuals progressing to the infectious class
and the proportion of symptomatic cases that are hospitalized
are the same for both index and secondary cases (i.e., c,i = c,s
and  I,i =  I,s ). Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario (B),
all index cases develop symptomatic disease (c,i = 1) and require
hospitalization ( I,i = 0).

MERS-CoV epidemiological parameters
The incubation period (1/k) was ﬁxed at 5.2 days according
to data from a hospital outbreak in Saudi Arabia (Assiri et al.,
2013a), and in line with information from travel-related cases
(Cauchemez et al., 2014). Based on 38 secondary cases with
disease severity information in our dataset, the proportion of
exposed individuals progressing to the symptomatic stage (c,s )
was estimated at 55.3% while the fraction of symptomatic cases
that were hospitalized (h ) was estimated at 76.2%. The recovery rate for cases in the community ( I,s ) was set at 1/5 days,
which is in line with SARS epidemiology (Lipsitch et al., 2003).
The average time from symptom onset to hospital admission
( a ) was estimated based on h =  a /( a +  I,s ). Baseline parameter
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Table 1
Epidemiological parameter estimates, ranges, and their sources. Prior distributions, posterior means and corresponding conﬁdence intervals, and the Geweke index are
provided for estimated epidemiological parameters (shaded cells) using the delayed rejection adaptive Metropolis-Hastings (DRAM) algorithm in a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo
(MCMC) framework.
Parameter

Scenario

Symbol

Initial/baseline

Range

Mean and
95% CI

Average
Geweke index

Source

The average daily rate of new
infections arising from exposure to
environmental/animal source
The mean human-human transmission
rate per day
Relative transmissibility of
hospitalized cases
The average daily rate of new
infections arising from exposure to
environmental/animal source
The mean human-human transmission
rate per day
Relative transmissibility of
hospitalized cases
Mean latent period (days)

A

˛

0.5

(0, 5)

0.5 (0.36,
0.63)

0.99

Estimated

A

ˇ

0.2

(0, 2)

0.97

Estimated

A

l

1.0

(0, 6)

0.10 (0.02,
0.21)
2.0 (0.57,5.0)

0.98

Estimated

B

˛

0.5

(0, 5)

0.29 (0.22,
0.37)

0.99

Estimated

B

ˇ

0.2

(0, 2)

0.97

Estimated

B

l

1.0

(0, 6)

0.08 (0.02,
0.17)
1.9 (0.60, 5.0)

0.98

Estimated

A, B

1/k

5.2

(3, 8)

–

–

A
B
A, B

c,i
c,i — 1
c,s ˇ

0.585

(0.3,
0.6)
(0.3,
0.6)

–

–

Assiri et al. (2013a),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
Primary data & SA

–

–

Primary data & SA

A
B

h,i
h,i = 1

0.708

(0.4,
0.8)

–

–

A, B

h,s

0.708

(0.4,
0.8)

–

–

Primary data & SA

A
B

1/ I,I
 I,i = 0

5.0

(3, 7)

–

–

Mean infectious period among
secondary cases (days)

A, B

1/ I,s

5.0

(3, 7)

–

–

Mean time from symptom onset to
hospital admission (days)
Mean length of hospital stay (days)

A, B

1/ a

 a = ␥I h /(1 − h )

–

–

–

Assiri et al. (2013a),
Donnelly et al. (2003),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
Assiri et al. (2013a),
Donnelly et al. (2003),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
SA

A, B

1/␥r

7.0

(5,10)

–

–

SA

Proportion of symptomatic and
infectious cases among index cases
Proportion of symptomatic and
infectious cases among secondary
cases
Proportion of hospitalized individuals
among symptomatic and infectious
index cases
Proportion of hospitalized individuals
among symptomatic and infectious
secondary cases
Mean infectious period among primary
cases (days)

0.585

SA = Sensitivity analysis.

values and ranges used for sensitivity analysis are shown in
Table 1.
The transmissibility of index and secondary cases, Ri and Rs , and
their relationship to Roverall
Classically, the basic reproduction number, denoted by R0
(Anderson and May, 1991; Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000)
quantiﬁes the average number of secondary cases generated by
infectious individuals in the absence of control interventions in
a completely susceptible population and at the beginning of an
epidemic. In order to compare our results to previous estimates
of the reproduction number for MERS-CoV (Breban et al., 2013;
Cauchemez et al., 2014), we deﬁne reproduction numbers Ri and Rs ,
as the average number of cases generated by a typical index and secondary case, respectively, and Roverall as the reproduction number
averaged over all the cases. Extension of classic branching process
results (Harris, 2002; Lange, 2010), provides the following relationship between the 3 transmission parameters (see supporting Text
S2 for details):
Roverall

Ri
=
1 − Rs + Ri

We note that Ri > 1 does not imply endemic spread the way that
R0 > 1 does. Indeed, the epidemic may die out if Ri > 1 but Rs < 1 and

hence Roverall remains below 1. Further, these parameters integrate
the impact of public health interventions (e.g. contact precautions,
isolation in hospital wards) on transmission.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A (c,i = c,s and  I,i =  I,s ),
the average transmissibility of index and secondary cases is the
same, following:





Ri = Rs = ˇ c,i





1
a + I,i



+l

1
r







a
a + I,i



.

where (1/( a +  I,i ) is the mean infectious period of community
cases,  a /( a +  I,i ) is the fraction symptomatic cases that are hospitalized, and 1/␥r is the mean infectious period of hospitalized cases
(see Chowell et al., 2006). This expression can be written as the sum
of the contributions of infectious individuals in the community and
the hospital as follows:
Ri = R

comm, i

+R

hosp, i

Rs = R

comm, s

+R

hosp, s

where R comm,i = R comm,s = ˇ(c,i /( a +  I,i )) and,
R

hosp, i

=R



hosp, s

= ˇ l c,i

 1 
r





a
a + I,i




.
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Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario B, the transmissibility of index cases is allowed to differ. Even if the reproduction
number of index cases was greater than 1 in this scenario, subcritical transmission among secondary cases would still ensure the
eventual extinction of all transmission chains. Under this scenario,
the reproduction number of secondary cases is given by:





Rs = ˇ c,s



1
a + I,s

 +l

1



r



a
a + I,s




,

whereas the reproduction number of index cases is given by:
Ri = ˇ

1
l
+
a
r

where R comm,i = (ˇ(1/ a )) and R hosp,i = (ˇ(l/␥r )) are the contributions of community index cases and hospitalized index cases to
transmission, respectively. Similarly, the contributions of community and hospital-based transmission to the reproduction number
of secondary cases are given by:


R

comm, s



=ˇ


R

hosp, s

= ˇl

c,i
a + I,i

c,i




1
r

and,




a
a + I,i




.

Parameter estimation
Since the date of symptom onset is lacking for a majority of
cases, our main analysis relies on ﬁtting our model to the total
number of MERS-CoV cases (“outbreak size”) for the study period
Apr–Oct 2013. As a sensitivity analysis, we also impute the missing
dates of symptom onset for visualization purposes and to attempt
to trajectory-match the cumulative number of daily cases (Text S1).
We estimated three parameters (daily rate of zoonotic infection, ˛; the human-human transmission rate, ˇ; and the relative
transmissibility of hospitalized cases, l) by ﬁtting our transmission
model predictions of Ci (t), Cs (t) and CIH (t) to the total observed
numbers of index, secondary and hospital-based secondary cases
at the end of our study period. We minimized the “sum of square
errors” between the corresponding model outputs and observed
case counts for each of the three transmission settings (reservoir, community, hospital). We used a delayed rejection adaptive
Metropolis-Hastings (DRAM) algorithm in a Markov-Chain MonteCarlo (MCMC) framework which has been previously described
in ref. (Haario et al., 2006) (Matlab package available from:
http://helios.fmi.ﬁ/∼lainema/mcmc/). We assumed uniform prior
distributions for ˛, ˇ and l with broad ranges (Table 1). We allowed
the algorithm to run for 10,000 iterations with an initial burn-in
of 5000 iterations to allow runs to reach a stationary regime. The
Geweke diagnostic method was employed to assess convergence of
chains (Geweke, 1992), with values close to 1 deemed satisfactory.
Posterior distributions for each parameter were obtained from the
underlying joint posterior distribution of resulting Markov chains.
Since our study period starts with a large hospital outbreak, the
outbreak simulation was initialized with one initial spillover case
(i.e., Ii (0) = 1) and also included a low number of exposed secondary
cases (i.e. Es (0) = 5). Parameter estimates were not sensitive to these
initial conditions.
Sensitivity analyses were performed by varying parameters
deﬁning the natural history of the disease (Table 1) and by ﬁtting
cumulative numbers of daily cases using interpolated onset dates,
instead of ﬁnal outbreak size data.

Quantifying stochastic uncertainty in outbreak progression
We reconstructed the stochastic uncertainty in the outbreak
progression (number of spillover and human-to-human transmission events) by parametric bootstrapping in order to generate
conservative uncertainty bounds for parameters. Speciﬁcally we
simulated 200 epidemic realizations of our best-ﬁt MERS-CoV
transmission model (Table 1) through a Poisson simulation
approach (Gustafsson and Sternad, 2007). We then estimated
model parameters for each of the 200 stochastic outbreak realizations by the MCMC approach described above and used the
distribution of estimated parameter values to construct 95% conﬁdence intervals. Parameter convergence for each of the 200 runs
was assessed by the Geweke diagnostic method (Geweke, 1992).
This “hybrid” estimation approach allowed us to accomplish two
goals: (1) estimate conservative parameter uncertainty bounds and
(2) assess identiﬁability of model parameters.
Implications of surveillance bias on previous estimates of
reproduction number
In order to model how previous estimates of Ri and Roverall
(Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) could be inﬂuenced by
surveillance bias, we assume that (1 − c,i ) of the MERS CoV cases
are asymptomatic, unobserved index cases that do not transmit any
infection. We then adjust previously reported estimates of Ri and
Roverall (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) to incorporate
the negligible transmission of unobserved cases (see supporting
Text S2 for details). In this framework, setting c,i = 1, corresponds
to taking the previous results at face value and is most similar to
our differential transmission model (scenario B). Meanwhile setting
c,i = 0.585 (per Table 1) is similar to our surveillance-bias model
(scenario A). This approach provides a synthesis of existing R estimates derived by different statistical methods and for different
levels of underreporting.
Results
Epidemiological data
The course of the MERS-CoV outbreak in Saudi Arabia from
April-8 to October-31, 2013, can be reconstructed from reported
and imputed dates of symptom onset (Fig. 2). Of the 122 reported
MERS-CoV cases during this period, 58 cases were putatively associated with exposure from a yet to be identiﬁed MERS-CoV reservoir
source, and hence considered ‘index cases’. The remaining 64 cases
were epidemiologically linked to an earlier case and hence classiﬁed as secondary cases. Of the 64 secondary cases, 47 were
symptomatic and 17 did not exhibit symptoms. Of the 47 secondary
symptomatic cases, 35 were linked to nosocomial transmission
(hospital-based secondary cases in our terminology).
Model ﬁtting
Convergence of our MERS-CoV transmission model ﬁt was
excellent for both the surveillance bias and differential transmission scenarios, as indicated by the corresponding Geweke indices
(Table 1). The average daily rate of MERS–CoV spillover events was
estimated at 0.5 (95% CI: 0.36, 0.63) cases a day for the ‘surveillancebias’ scenario A. The spillover rate estimate was somewhat lower
under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario B, with ˛ —
— 0.29 (95%
CI: 0.22, 0.37) cases a day. Our estimates for the human-to-human
transmission rate and the relative transmissibility of hospitalized cases vs community cases were consistent for both scenarios
(See ˇ and l values in Table 1). However, our simulation study
revealed a signiﬁcant negative correlation between these parameters (Spearman rho = −0.96, P < 0.001), which precluded a reliable
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Fig. 2. Temporal progression of MERS-CoV symptomatic cases according to exposure history by date of symptom onset, 08-April 2013 to 27-October 2013, Saudi Arabia
(A and B). The gray shading shows the range of 500 cumulative curves obtained from the imputation strategy because the date of symptom onset was not available for all
cases. The red solid line is the mean of the ensemble of curves. The overall percentage contribution of index cases, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based
symptomatic cases, and asymptomatic cases to the total number of reported cases are also shown (C).

identiﬁcation of these two parameters from data. Nevertheless,
we were able to ﬁnd reasonably well-bounded estimates of R as
detailed below.
Reproduction number estimates
Despite potential correlation between 2 of the estimated parameters (ˇ and l), reproduction numbers were estimated with good

precision (Fig. 3). Both epidemiological scenarios indicated that
the average transmissibility of secondary MERS-CoV cases remains
below the critical threshold of 1.0 and underscored the importance
of hospital-based transmission, estimated to be over 4-fold higher
than community-based transmission for both index and secondary
cases (Table 2).
Under the ‘surveillance-bias’ scenario A, we estimated that the
transmission potential of both index and secondary cases was well

Fig. 3. Distributions of the reproduction numbers for index and secondary cases and the relative contributions of community and hospitalized cases according to each
epidemiological scenario. Scenario A: ‘Surveillance bias”. Scenario B: ‘Transmission bias’ (see text).
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Table 2
Reproduction number estimates and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals derived from the uncertainty analysis described in the text for index (spillover) and secondary
cases and the corresponding contributions of community and hospitalized cases to the reproduction number.
Surveillance bias scenario (Scenario A)
Index cases
Ri

Secondary cases
R

hosp,i

0.45 (0.29, 0.61)
0.36 (0.24, 0.47)
Differential-transmissibility scenario (Scenario B)
Index cases
R hosp,i
Ri
0.88 (0.58, 1.20)
0.72 (0.51, 0.99)

R

Rs

R

0.08 (0.02, 0.18)

0.45 (0.29, 0.61)

0.36 (0.24, 0.47)

0.08 (0.02, 0.18)

R comm,i
0.16 (0.04, 0.36)

Secondary cases
Rs
0.36 (0.24, 0.51)

R hosp,s
0.30 (0.21, 0.41)

R comm,s
0.07 (0.02, 0.15)

comm,i

below 1.0, with Ri = Rs = 0.45 (95% CI: 0.29, 0.61). Hospital-based
transmission was estimated to be a major contributor to the outbreak, with R hosp,i = R hosp,s = 0.36 (95% CI: 0.24, 0.47), which is
about 4.5-times higher than the contribution of community-based
transmission (R comm,i = R comm,s = 0.08 (95% CI: 0.02, 0.18), Table 2).
In other words, the contribution of hospital-based transmission to
the reproduction number (Ri = Rs ) was 82.0% (95% CI: 65.8, 94.3)
(Fig. 4).
Under the ‘differential-transmissibility’ scenario B, the reproduction number of index cases was substantially higher than that
of secondary cases, with Ri = 0.88 (95% CI: 0.58, 1.20), and Rs = 0.36
(95% CI: 0.24, 0.51). The contribution of hospital-based transmission to the reproduction number of index cases was 82.7% (95% CI:
66.3, 94.4). Hospital-based transmission contributed similarly to
the reproduction number of index and secondary cases (Fig. 4).
Based on our model, we estimate that a 20% reduction in the
transmissibility of hospitalized cases would decrease the total
number of secondary cases by 27%, and an 80% reduction in hospital transmission would decrease the number of secondary cases
by 72%. By contrast, a 20% and 80% reduction in community transmission would only lead to a 12% and 28% reduction in numbers of
secondary cases, respectively.
Outbreak simulations and sensitivity analyses
Overall, the extrapolated daily curves of cumulative symptomatic cases followed closely the surveillance bias model’s

hosp,s

R

comm,s

predicted uncertainty bounds except for the early part of the
study period when a substantial number of secondary cases were
reported, in association with the large hospital outbreak (Fig. 5).
Based on the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario, we estimated that a total of
98 spillover cases (95% CI: 81–119) and 86 secondary cases (95% CI:
42–132) occurred during our study period, so that only 59% of index
cases and 55% of secondary cases were symptomatic cases reported
through active surveillance. These results are in line with the original assumption of unbalanced detection probability between index
and secondary cases. For illustration, Fig. 6 shows the predicted
effects of control interventions (targeting community-based or
hospital-based transmission, via parameter l), pathogen adaptation
to humans (i.e, increase in baseline transmission rate, ˇ), and potential increases in reservoir spillover rate (via parameter ˛), relative
to the baseline ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario, average reproduction
number estimates remained well below the epidemic threshold of
R = 1 under various sensitivity analyses for natural history parameters (Table 1). Mean estimates of the reproduction number for
index and secondary cases (Ri = Rs ) ranged from 0.43 to 0.51 while
the ratio of the contribution of hospital-based to community-based
transmission to the reproduction number ranged from 2.66 to
7.75 in sensitivity analyses. Moreover, the contribution of hospitalbased transmission to the reproduction number ranged from 71.7%
to 82.5%.
Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario, although reproduction number estimates were more dependent on various

Fig. 4. The percentage contribution of hospital-based transmission to the reproduction number of secondary cases for the surveillance bias and the transmission bias
scenarios. Similar hospital-based contributions were obtained for index cases for both epidemiological scenarios (not shown).
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Fig. 5. Temporal variation in MERS symptomatic cases associated with index (zoonotic) events and secondary (human-to-human) transmission as predicted from the model
ﬁt to the data according to epidemiological scenario A (‘Surveillance bias’, top). The mean (red solid line) and 95% uncertainty bounds (gray shading) generated from stochastic
simulation as described in the text are shown. The blue dashed line is the approximate observed progression of symptomatic MERS-CoV cases by date of symptom onset (onset
dates imputed as in Fig. 2). The overall percentage contribution of index cases, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based symptomatic cases, and asymptomatic
cases to the total number of cases according for each epidemiological scenario are also shown (bottom). The radius of the pie chart for scenario B (‘transmission bias’) was
scaled proportionally according to the total number of cases predicted from scenario A. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)

assumptions about the natural history of disease, endemic transmission remained improbable since Rs was consistently less than
one and ranged from 0.21 to 0.43. In contrast, the reproduction
number of index cases Ri ranged from 0.72 to 2.46. For index cases
the ratio of the contribution of hospital-based to community-based
transmission to the reproduction number ranged from 2.4 to 4.4
while the percentage contribution of hospital-based transmission
ranged from 69.4% to 84.0%. A similar contribution of hospitalbased transmission to the reproduction number of secondary cases
was obtained. Geweke convergence statistics showed excellent
convergence for all estimated parameters in sensitivity analyses
(average >0.95).
Synthesis of estimates of MERS-CoV transmission potential, 2013
outbreak
Our results provide perspective on two previous studies that
have quantiﬁed the transmission potential of MERS-CoV (Breban
et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) (Fig. 7). Breban et al. (2013) use
an inference method that assumes the transmission of index cases
is similar to the transmission of secondary cases to produce two
estimates of Roverall . Two separate estimates for Roverall (0.60 and
0.69) are reported based on whether ambiguously classiﬁed cases
are favored to be primary or secondary cases. When these estimates
are combined, the 95% conﬁdence interval for these reproduction
numbers spans 0.42–0.92. In their model, the inferred value for Ri
is also 0.42–0.92, because no distinction between Ri and Roverall is
made.
Cauchemez et al. (2014) use a similar method, but more data, to
produce a 95% conﬁdence interval of 0.47–0.85 for Roverall . However,

they also utilize an additional technique that incorporates data on
the speciﬁc timing of cases (but assumes perfect observation of
cases) to infer two separate 95% conﬁdence intervals for Ri that span
0.67–1.50. Based on the approach of taking the observed data at
face-value these prior results are best compared to our differential
transmission scenario.
We can also adjust these prior results based on the assumption that asymptomatic index cases occur in the same proportion
as in our surveillance bias scenario, but they escape surveillance.
The adjusted 95% conﬁdence intervals for Breban et al.’s model are
0.25–0.54 for Ri and 0.30–0.87 for Roverall . The adjusted 95% conﬁdence intervals for Cauchemez et al.’s model are 0.39–0.88 for Ri
and 0.34–0.77 for Roverall. These adjusted values are best compared
to our surveillance bias results.
Key trends emerge from comparing reproduction number estimates across studies (Fig. 7). First, although some of the models
include the possibility that Ri > 1, none of them suggest that
Roverall > 1. This argues against the possibility that MERS-CoV is
self-sustaining in humans. Rather, continual introduction from a
non-human reservoir is needed for persistence. However, because
some models predict Ri > 1, it is unclear whether the lack of endemic
spread is due to effective control interventions or intrinsically
weak human-to-human transmissibility. Second, when observation bias is incorporated into parameter estimation, the range of
possible values for both Ri and Roverall shift to smaller values. This
may appear counter-intuitive because the existence of unobserved
cases might suggest that transmission was under-estimated previously. This apparent paradox is a result of our assumption that
asymptomatic index cases (rather than secondary cases) are the
least likely to be observed.
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Fig. 6. The effect of control interventions relatively to ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A (targeting hospital or community-based transmission) as well as the effect of potential
pathogen adaptation to humans (increase in baseline transmission rate), and geographic spread with potential increases in reservoir spillover rate (via parameter alpha)
or hospital-based transmission (via parameter l). The percentage contribution of index cases, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based symptomatic cases, and
asymptomatic cases to the total number of cases according for each epidemiological scenario are shown. The radiuses of the pie charts were scaled proportionally according
to the total number of cases predicted from the baseline scenario A.

Discussion
We have used dynamic epidemic modeling and branching processes to analyze epidemiological data on the progression of the
MERS-CoV outbreak in Apr-Oct 2013 in Saudi Arabia (Cotten et al.,
2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014; Assiri et al., 2013a,b; Penttinen et al.,
2013; WHO MERS, 2013; Tefanie Gierer et al., 2013). Our analysis
has focused on resolving uncertainty surrounding the transmissibility of MERS-CoV in its early dissemination phase, and quantifying
the speciﬁc contributions of index, secondary, community and hospitalized cases, as well as surveillance bias, to the overall level
of transmission. In the process we have provided perspective on
the broad ranges of reproduction number estimates presented in
two recent studies of the MERS-CoV outbreak (Breban et al., 2013;
Cauchemez et al., 2014). All of the models consistently suggest
that human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV remained subcritical in 2013, arguing against the possibility that the outbreak
was self-sustaining in humans. However, some models predict that
the reproduction number of zoonotic cases may be higher than 1,
which may support the effectiveness of control measures applied
among contacts of identiﬁed cases, and could signal a potential
acceleration of the epidemic if these measures were to be relaxed.
Prior studies of MERS-CoV have acknowledged that surveillance bias can complicate the inference of transmission parameters
(Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014). However, rather than
accepting the possibility of surveillance bias as a limitation of our
study, our analysis has explicitly incorporated its potential impact,

while also considering an alternative ‘transmission bias’ scenario
where observations are taken at face value. When we incorporate the possibility that less severe index cases are unobserved, the
range of possible reproduction numbers in our study and previously
published models (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014)
shifts to smaller values (Fig. 7). Since convergence of our model to
data is high in both the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario and ‘differential
transmission’ scenarios, further information is needed to tease out
the extent to which observation bias operated in 2013 and beyond.
For example, targeted serological studies in communities where
index cases have been reported could shed light on the fraction of
index cases that may be unobserved. Further, it would be helpful to
know more about the MERS-CoV surveillance process in Saudi Arabia, and determine whether individual cases were detected because
they self-reported to a health center or were actively discovered
via contact tracing of a severe case. More information on standards
of clinical practice would also be helpful, such as the probability
that a patient who presents with milder symptoms to a health care
facility would be diagnosed with MERS-CoV. Ancillary data from
laboratories would also be helpful such as the overall number of
samples that were tested for MERS-CoV and their spatio-temporal
distribution.
A particular concern for the epidemic potential of MERS-CoV
is that the virus shares features of the related coronavirus that
caused outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
2003, spanning several countries and continents (Ksiazek et al.,
2003). Both MERS-CoV and SARS viruses can invade the lower
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Fig. 7. Synthesizing available estimates for the reproduction number of MERS CoV.
The 95% conﬁdence intervals for the reproduction number averaged over all cases
(Roverall ) and averaged over index cases (Ri ) are shown. Besides the two transmission
scenarios considered in this study (black and gray dots), the plot includes results of
Breban et al. (2013) and Cauchemez et al. (2014). The key distinction among the
models are that Breban et al. (2013) modeled primary and secondary transmission
as being similar; Cauchemez et al. (2014) used the timing of cases to estimate Ri ; our
differential transmission model accounts for the higher observed disease severity of
index cases; and our surveillance bias model considers the possibility that all weakly
transmitting and asymptomatic index cases are unobserved. A modiﬁed version of
Breban et al. and Cauchemez et al. are also shown in the plot that compensate for
the possibility of unobserved index cases and thus allow direct comparison to our
surveillance bias model. Cauchemez et al.’s results are presented as a conﬁdence
region because their inference of Roverall was separate from their inference of Ri . All
the other models contain an intrinsic dependence between Roverall and Ri and so
these results are presented as a curve.

respiratory tract and cause severe pneumonia (de Wit et al., 2013;
Franks et al., 2003). Both infections are considered severe, especially among older adults with underlying medical conditions
(Assiri et al., 2013b; Donnelly et al., 2003). Our ﬁndings indicate that
the transmissibility MERS-CoV in secondary cases remained well
below the epidemic threshold in Saudi Arabia in 2013, ensuring
that all human-to-human transmission chains go extinct (Ferguson
et al., 2004). At the time of this writing, there was not enough
resolution in MERS-CoV phylogenetic data to assess whether transmission was only endemic in the animal reservoir or could persist
in humans (Cauchemez et al., 2014). Based on our synthesis of
epidemiological data and existing models, we argue that the transmission potential of MERS-CoV is currently low based on the
progression of the 2013 outbreak, and on the same order as that
of other stage III viral zoonoses such as inﬂuenza A/H5N1, monkeypox or Nipah virus, although much higher than that of inﬂuenza
A/H7N9 (Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a,b; Chowell et al., 2013).
In contrast, the reproduction number for SARS was estimated to be
∼2–3 during the pre-intervention period (Riley et al., 2003; Lipsitch
et al., 2003). Although our study cannot speak to the dynamics
of the recent resurgence of cases in Spring 2014, it is reassuring
that disease transmission remained limited to the Arabian Peninsula throughout June 2014. Indeed, chains of transmission initiated
by infected travelers returning to Europe, Africa, Asia and North
America have remained extremely short (Cauchemez et al., 2014).
Despite these reassuring ﬁndings of weak secondary transmission based on 2013 MERS-CoV cases, we cannot rule out that
transmissibility of index cases Ri , was substantially higher, with
a 95% CI ranging from 0.6 to 1.2 (‘transmission bias’ scenario). If
Ri happened to be greater than one, it is then essential to understand why Rs was less than one. One possibility is that control
interventions around identiﬁed secondary cases were particularly
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effective in 2013. If this were the case, it is imperative to identify
which of these interventions were most effective so that they can
be rapidly implemented in the event that MERS-CoV spreads to a
new geographic region. A similar situation arose in the last days
of smallpox eradication, as stringent control measures were put in
place once cases were identiﬁed, limiting the transmission of secondary cases (Fenner et al., 1988). Alternatively, it may be that there
is an intrinsically biological phenomenon in which humans infected
by a zoonotic reservoir experience more clinically severe disease,
and in turn a higher transmission potential than those infected by
humans. In this case, further adaptation of MERS-CoV to humans
would be required for sustainable transmission to occur. A deﬁnite
identiﬁcation of the reservoir for MERS-CoV would help to shed
light on potential variation in doses and route of exposure between
index and secondary cases, which may account for the observed
differences in onward transmission.
Because any increase in Rs leads to a greater than linear increase
in size of transmission chains (Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a),
and the rate of MERS-CoV reports appears to increase (Cauchemez
et al., 2014), there is strong motivation to ascertain the potential impact of control interventions. A key ﬁnding of our analysis
was that the number of MERS-CoV cases caused by hospital-based
transmission was 4.3 to 4.6-fold higher than community-based
transmission and estimates were robust to a variety of sensitivity analysis. These ﬁndings are reminiscent of SARS (Varia et al.,
2003; Lau et al., 2004; Tambyah et al., 2003) and indicate that
more stringent hospital control measures would be particularly
effecting at reducing transmission. The reasons for increased hospital transmission could include increased intensity and duration
of viral shedding, or increased contacts with particularly vulnerable patients (Seto et al., 2003; Chowell et al., 2004). Understanding
the MERS-CoV transmission process in the hospital is particularly
important in light of recent reports of widespread infection among
camels in North Africa (Chu et al., 2014), where low-resources
could make surveillance and hospital control measures far harder
to implement.
Our study is prone to limitations, as we made important simplifying assumptions to safeguard tractable inference. First, we
assumed that the rate of zoonotic introductions into the human
populations was constant. This assumption may be reasonable if
MERS-CoV prevalence level in the zoonotic reservoir has reached
an endemic state and the rate of animal-to-human contacts was stable throughout our study period. Similarly, we have not attempted
to quantify changes in the baseline transmission rate or the relative transmissibility of hospitalized cases over time, but we ﬁt
our model solely to cases that occurred when pro-active surveillance was implemented in Saudi Arabia (Memish et al., 2014).
Further, we assume that asymptomatic cases do not transmit infection. However, given that MERS-CoV secondary cases have typically
been traceable to an index case it seems unlikely that there can
be much asymptomatic transmission as this would lead to difﬁculty in reconstructing transmission chains. Another limitation of
our model is that parameters ˇ and l were not uniquely identiﬁed,
although we were able to ﬁnd reasonably well-bounded estimates
of R. This is not entirely surprising, as a similar phenomenon occurs
when a simple SIR model is ﬁtted to the early exponential phase
of an epidemic. In such a simple model, both ˇ (the transmission
rate) and  (the recovery rate) are not identiﬁable. Yet, the ratio
beta/gamma = R0 is often identiﬁable in practice.
More elaborate models either based on dynamic systems or
branching processes could be developed for MERS-CoV to incorporate more realistic mixing structures and possibly reﬁne the
spillover transmission dynamics. Although our model assumes
homogeneous mixing within community and hospital populations, our results did not warrant further model heterogeneity
given limited available data. As more data become available, these
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assumptions could be reﬁned particularly if the pathogen’s intrinsic transmissibility increases or if the virus spreads to poor areas
where nosocomial transmission may be ampliﬁed. An important
issue in modeling outbreaks in the Arabian Peninsula is the lack of
information on age- and gender-speciﬁc contact rate patterns, as it
has been done for European countries (Lee et al., 2003). Finally, we
did not consider the progression of more recent cases of MERS-CoV
reported after October 2013, to maintain comparability with previous transmission studies (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al.,
2014).
In conclusion, modeling of available MERS-CoV case data
reported during Apr–Oct 2013 in Saudi Arabia found robust support for the lack of persistence of the infection in humans without
continued reintroduction from the reservoir. However, as with
all emerging zoonoses, the potential for viral adaptation towards
increased transmissibility is a real threat that needs careful monitoring. We have highlighted how observation bias (particularly the
difﬁculty in observing asymptomatic and less severe index cases)
can skew the inference and interpretation of transmission parameters. In particular, more data on the surveillance process is needed
so that the transmission potential of index cases can be more rigorously ascertained both retrospectively and in the on-going 2014
outbreak. The relative transmissibility of primary and secondary
cases has important implications for the efﬁcacy of current control measures and the potential for spread in other regions that are
more resource-limited. As a focal point of control, we have found
that over 80% of transmission events are likely occurring in a hospital setting. We hope that future surveillance efforts can elucidate
speciﬁc mechanisms of hospital-based transmission and effective
control so that targeted interventions can be rapidly implemented
if MERS-CoV spreads globally or adapts to humans.
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